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even the ultimate outcome is not always to be regarded as final. The 
defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for 
which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at a later date. 
ClaUseWItZ
war is like unto fire; those who will not put aside weapons are them-
selves consumed by them. 
lI CHUaN
ThuCyDIDES ON POlICy, STRATEgy, AND  
WAR TERMINATION
 for decades, thucydides’s account of the Peloponnesian War has been a staple of professional military education at american war colleges, the Naval War 
College especially.1 and with good reason—he self-consciously supplies his read-
ers a microcosm of all war. With extraordinary drama and scrupulous attention 
to detail he addresses the fundamental and recurring problems of strategy at all 
times and places. these include the origins of war, 
the clashing political objectives of belligerents, 
the strategies they choose to achieve them, and 
the likely character of their conflicts. as the war 
escalates, thucydides expands his readers’ field 
of vision. He compels them to consider the un-
intended consequences of decisions of statesmen 
and commanders and the asymmetric struggle 
between athenian sea and spartan land power. 
He shows the ways in which each side reassessed 
and adapted to the other; the problems of coalition 
warfare; indirect strategies through proxy wars, 
insurgencies, and other forms of rebellion; the 
influence of domestic politics on strategy, and vice 
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versa; and myriad other enduring strategic problems that those who wage war at 
any time ignore at their peril. as a student of war and politics, whatever his faults, 
he was a giant with few peers, if any at all. yet thucydides says relatively little 
about peace, peacemakers, and peacemaking. Not surprisingly, then, what he has 
to say on this subject often receives little attention at the war colleges, especially 
when there are so many other rich questions to explore in his account.
one thing thucydides does say, however, needs to be pondered carefully to 
understand the problem of terminating the Peloponnesian War or any other. 
the Peace of Nicias—at the end of the so-called archidamean War, a full decade 
into the twenty-seven-year war between the athenian-led delian league and the 
spartan-led Peloponnesian league—cannot, he argues, “rationally be considered 
a state of peace,” despite the efforts of peacemakers like Nicias to turn it into one. 
Instead, it was a “treacherous armistice” or an unstable truce (5.26).2 although 
thucydides never defines “peace,” his distinction between peace and a truce 
indicates that he had some idea of what peace might mean in theory, even if it 
was difficult, indeed impossible, to establish it between the athenians and their 
rivals in the Peloponnesian league. Peace for him appears to be something very 
Clausewitzian: the acceptance by the belligerents that the result of their last war is 
final, not something to be revised through violent means when conditions change 
or opportunity is ripe.3 
the Peace of Nicias was not the only occasion when thucydides treated a 
peace treaty as a mere truce (spondē). He also used the word “truce” to describe 
the thirty year Peace, the treaty that officially, at least, put an end to the first 
Peloponnesian War of 462/1–445 bCe (1.115). some modern scholars, skepti-
cal that the second Peloponnesian War (431–404 bCe, popularly referred to as 
simply “the Peloponnesian War”) was inevitable, have argued that this agreement 
was a genuine peace. according to this view, athens accepted the result of the 
first war as final and became a “sated power,” no longer aiming to expand its em-
pire by force.4 thucydides emphatically did not think this was the case, however. 
because thucydides’s account of the war is not the same as the war itself, it is pos-
sible that thucydides was wrong, but we will never understand his work unless 
we try to understand him on his own terms, which is the objective of this article. 
Indeed, without a serious effort to understand thucydides’s own view of the rela-
tion among policy, strategy, and war termination, efforts to analyze his account 
critically are likely to produce more heat than light. they may even so distort 
understanding of thucydides and the Peloponnesian War that they rob both the 
author and his chosen case study of the enduring strategic value they deserve.
to understand why thucydides did not think either the thirty year Peace 
or the Peace of Nicias brought the Peloponnesian War to an end, one must 
pay careful attention to his presentation of the objectives and strategies of the 
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belligerents. the war waxed and waned, and waxed and waned, like a fever (or a 
plague, thucydides might say) because of a clash of policies that made it impos-
sible for either athens or sparta to accept the result of their most recent conflict 
as final. their political objectives were fundamentally incompatible. athens was 
determined to expand; sparta was no less determined to contain athens, if nec-
essary, by overthrowing its empire and its democratic regime. If so, the second 
Peloponnesian War was inevitable, and not because it was predetermined but 
because the first Peloponnesian War never really ended—that is, neither side was 
willing to change its revisionist objectives. each side’s objectives clashed inher-
ently with the other’s sense of the requirements of its own safety. each sought to 
exploit opportunities to revise the settlements of their previous conflicts as soon 
as opportunity arose. each placed such high value on its objectives that it would 
risk war rather than give them up. so the first Peloponnesian War dragged on 
and on, and then the second Peloponnesian War, on and on through the Peace of 
Nicias and beyond, until one side was able to overthrow the other’s regime and 
replace it with something fundamentally less threatening.
the repeated failures to terminate the war, in thucydides’s account, cast the 
motives, policies, and strategies of the belligerents in a fundamentally different 
light than typically seen among strategists today. It is common to suggest that 
athens under Pericles chose a delbrueckian strategy of exhausting sparta and 
that sparta, under archidamus, chose an equally delbrueckian strategy of anni-
hilating the athenian army in a major land battle early in the war.5 If one assumes 
athens was a sated power, then there is some sense in describing its strategy as an 
effort to win, by not losing, a war of exhaustion with sparta that would maintain 
the status quo ante. If one follows thucydides and assumes that athens was an 
expansionist power, however, a more ambitious diplomatic and military strategy 
was going to be necessary, and such a strategy is readily apparent for those willing 
and able to connect the dots. 
Under Pericles especially, that strategy was to break up the Peloponnesian 
league as a prelude to further expansion in the west, toward Italy and sicily in 
particular. spartan authorities—presuming they understood that the athenians 
were attempting to destroy the Peloponnesian league—had little choice but to 
counter by supporting sparta’s own allies. When sparta’s annual invasions of at-
tica are seen as part of a larger coalition strategy, they do not look like utopian 
efforts to achieve a knockout blow, though the spartans would have been grate-
ful had the athenians been foolish enough to cooperate by risking a decisive 
engagement outside their walls. because athens’ long walls (that is, those reach-
ing about six miles, with a road between, to the port of Piraeus) had rendered it 
invulnerable to direct assault by the spartan army, there is good reason to think 
that archidamus, especially, understood that sparta could not win a war of 
3
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annihilation, that its best option was a war of exhaustion. the spartans needed to 
coordinate with actual and potential allies, especially Persia and rebels from the 
delian league, to tie down athens in a multitheater war. so even if the spartans’ 
annual invasions failed to induce the athenians to commit strategic suicide by 
fighting outside the walls or to inflict so much damage on the countryside that 
the athenians sued for peace, they contributed mightily to a multitheater strat-
egy of attrition that would force the athenians to fight everywhere, leaving them 
strong nowhere. Ultimately that is how sparta won the war, despite much spartan 
incompetence and with much unintended help from the athenians, who would 
have achieved a much better outcome if they had been willing to make a genuine 
peace earlier in the twenty-seven-year war.
so long as the mutually exclusive political objectives of athens and sparta 
remained unchanged, the second Peloponnesian War was inevitable and un-
likely to end. but war as such is not inevitable. one significant inference from 
thucydides’s account of the failure of the belligerents to terminate this war 
effectively is that the art of peace is to prevent the violent clash of policies that 
produce and protract warfare. although thucydides makes clear that he does 
not think athens was ever a sated power, it should have been. to whatever extent 
our own world resembles that of thucydides, he helps us ponder, among many 
other things, one of the fundamental global strategic problems of the twenty-first 
century: that both old and new powers will need to find the self-restraint to pre-
vent dissatisfaction with previous peace settlements, which are often mere truces, 
from escalating into general war.
i
thucydides had a thesis—that the events and debates immediately before the 
outbreak of the second Peloponnesian War were not as important to its origins 
as something more fundamental, the growth of athenian power and the fear it 
inspired in sparta. athenian growth and spartan fear of it constituted the “tru-
est cause” of the war (1.23, 1.88).6 His Pentecontaetia, or history of the fifty years 
between the end of the Persian Wars and the crises over Corcyra and Potidaea at 
the outbreak of the second Peloponnesian War, was designed to prove that thesis. 
one can summarize his complex argument the following way.
first, despite strategic cooperation during the Persian Wars, sparta and ath-
ens were deeply suspicious of each other almost from the moment they forced 
the Persians to retreat from the greek mainland after the battles of salamis, 
Plataea, and Mycale in 480–79 bCe. When athens began to rebuild its walls in 
479, sparta and its allies, seeing the enormous growth of athenian naval power 
during the Persian Wars, began to be afraid. so they made one of the first calls 
for universal and unilateral arms control, even partial disarmament, in recorded 
4
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history. they asked the athenians not to rebuild their walls but instead to join 
them in tearing down the walls of all the cities in greece. they argued, disin-
genuously, that walled cities would merely give the Persians strong points for 
defense if they invaded again and that anyway all greeks could retreat to spartan 
protection in the Peloponnesus if the Persians returned (1.90). distrust breeds 
distrust. the athenians could not help finding something one-sided and deceit-
ful in the spartan arms-control proposal, which would leave them vulnerable 
to sparta’s famously disciplined army of hoplites (that is, armored foot soldiers 
fighting in disciplined phalanxes) reinforced by forces from its allies. so under 
the advice of themistocles, the fox who had outsmarted the Persians at salamis, 
they continued to rebuild their walls covertly. themistocles, still highly regarded 
in sparta as a hero of the Persian Wars, went to sparta, where he deceived the 
spartans deliberately by delaying arms-control talks until the walls were rebuilt. 
once they were completed themistocles declared athenian independence from 
spartan hegemony, announcing that athens knew its best interests and was now 
strong enough to pursue them without asking permission from sparta or anyone 
else (1.91–92). says sun tzu, the best strategy is to attack the opponent’s strat-
egy.7 the long walls, the athenian “strategic defense Initiative,” were a breakout 
strategy that rendered obsolete sparta’s traditional strategy of dominating greece 
in decisive land battles. 
second, it was not Pericles, then, but themistocles who was the father of athe-
nian grand strategy, which had two components. one was defense by land behind 
long walls down to Piraeus, the port of athens, walls that made athens a de facto 
island, able to feed itself by sea and invulnerable to attack by land. the other was 
offense by sea, which the athenians undertook with the utmost vigor from 479 
to the outbreak of the first Peloponnesian War in 462/1. their objective was to 
clear the Persians from the aegean and to build and expand their maritime alli-
ance, the delian league, to keep the Persians out. It was themistocles who told 
the athenians to become a naval power and thereby “lay the foundations of the 
empire.” allies-cum-subjects gradually saw their dues for defense transformed, 
under Pericles especially, into tribute to athens, thus financing the growing and 
powerful navy by which athens ruled its allies, who came to see the city as a ty-
rant exploiting them for its benefit (1.93, 1.96–99). 
third, seeing all this unfold, sparta was not idle, though it proceeded cau-
tiously and covertly. When rebels from the athenian empire on the island of tha-
sos asked for sparta’s aid in 466/62 (?), the spartan authorities promised secretly 
to go to war with athens, thus establishing a fundamental principle of spartan 
strategy (1.101).8 the best time for sparta to go to war with athens was when 
athens was already committed to fighting in some other theater. the athenian 
walls made it possible for athens to withstand a siege indefinitely, yet that did not 
6
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mean sparta had no counter. If the athenians were compelled to fight not merely 
in attica but also throughout their empire, they might lose the will to carry on or 
even the empire that enabled them to carry on. In the former case, there could be 
a negotiated settlement; in the latter, the spartans just might be able to overthrow 
not merely the empire but even the democratic regime (arguably the source of all 
their troubles) in athens itself. 
timing is often everything, however. before the spartans were able to go to 
war to support thasos and potentially many other rebel cities against athens, 
there was an earthquake in sparta in 462/1 (?). It enabled the Helots, the enslaved 
descendants of the Messenians whom the spartans had conquered previously, 
and who constituted the overwhelming majority of sparta’s population, to rebel. 
rather than fight a two-front war against athens and the Helots, the spartans 
canceled or postponed their plan to attack athens and instead called on that city, 
their formal ally, known for expertise in siege warfare, to help them put down the 
Helots in their last redoubts at Mount Ithome. traditional spartan xenophobia, 
combined with suspicion of the “revolutionary and enterprising” character of 
the athenians, led to a change of heart, however (1.102). the spartans dismissed 
the athenians, saying they no longer needed their aid. It must have been about 
this time that the athenians learned the spartans had planned to attack them to 
support the revolt at thasos—an important reason for the spartans to wish them 
to depart, lest the athenians betray them first by an alliance with the Helots. Not 
surprisingly, in light of both sparta’s betrayal and its rejection of their aid against 
the Helots, the athenians left sparta in a huff, broke off their alliance with sparta, 
and allied instead with argos, sparta’s traditional competitor for hegemony in the 
Peloponnesus, as well as with the thessalians in the north (1.102). 
fourth, the athenians allied with Megara, on the Isthmus of Corinth, and ac-
tually helped it build its long walls down to the sea, so that it could be resupplied 
in case of assault (1.103). In effect, in doing so the athenians extended their own 
long walls from attica to the isthmus, with extraordinarily important strategic 
consequences. attica would be safe from invasion by land from the Pelopon-
nesus. sparta would be cut off from its major ally on land—thebes, in boeotia. 
also, through Megara’s port on the Crisaean gulf, Pegae, athens had now estab-
lished a base for expansion in the west. through the alliance with Megara, which 
was at war with Corinth, the traditional hegemon in the Crisaean gulf, athens 
engendered bitter hatred on the part of Corinth, a maritime power in its own 
right and fabled for wealth derived from trade over its isthmus. 
fifth, the athenians were expanding in all directions in the first Pelopon-
nesian War. In the west, they had control of both of Megara’s ports, Nisaea and 
Pegae. they had already established a base for Helot refugees from sparta at 
Naupactus, which could serve as a base for the athenian fleet in the Crisaean 
7
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gulf (1.103). they gained control of achaea on the opposite side of the gulf, 
thus potentially acquiring the ability to bottle up Corinth in the gulf. toward the 
south, they acquired troezen in the Peloponnesus as an ally, presumably as a base 
for linking up with argos, if and when athenians and argos intended to unite to 
fight the spartans in the Peloponnesus. to the north, they sought to extend their 
hegemony into boeotia (1.108). Most amazing of all, to the south they gave up on 
an expedition to Cyprus and decided instead to send two hundred ships to aid a 
rebellion in egypt against the Persian empire, presumably to gain access to the 
grain and the seemingly infinite wealth of egypt (1.104).
sixth, the athenians failed to achieve their objectives in the first Pelopon-
nesian War in large part because they were overextended and fighting in too 
many theaters. the egyptians drained the canals of the Nile, thus trapping and 
annihilating the athenian naval expedition. In an ironic anticipation of later 
athenian failure in sicily, the egyptians also destroyed another athenian fleet 
sent to reinforce the first (1.109–10). the boeotians were able to defeat athens 
on land at Coronea and so to recover their independence (1.113). the cities of 
euboea, from which athens received much of its food, revolted, thus forcing ath-
ens to divert forces to subdue them (1.114). Most importantly, Megara defected to 
the Peloponnesian league, meaning the gate to Peloponnesian invasion of attica 
was open (1.114).
seventh, with the entire empire at risk and the athenians fighting on multiple 
fronts, athens had little choice but to agree to the thirty year Peace treaty with 
sparta and its allies, who demanded a heavy price. the athenians had to give up 
Nisaea and Pegae, as well as achaea and troezen (1.115). three of these sacrifices 
served primarily the interests of Corinth, which could not have wished to con-
front athens in the Crisaean gulf. (Not coincidentally, they were to loom large in 
athenian demands during peace talks with sparta after the athenians’ stunning 
victories at Pylos and sphacteria in the second Peloponnesian War [4.21].) Most 
importantly, the thirty year Peace required sparta and athens not to encroach 
on each other’s allies and to settle future quarrels through arbitration.
largely because athens had overextended itself, a blunder Pericles refused 
to let the athenians forget (1.144), the spartans and their allies had contained, 
even rolled back, athenian expansion, with future controversies to be solved 
through arbitration, not war. but for how long? the treaty, like most others in 
thucydides’s account, had an expiration date, thirty years—that is, long enough 
for both sides to recover from the war, if they were patient. that most such trea-
ties in thucydides’s account come with expiration dates is important. It reveals 
that most of the treaties not only were but were assumed by the belligerents them-
selves to be nothing but truces, meaning that the belligerents did not expect final 
results to their wars. as Herodotus observes, in peace sons bury their fathers, in 
8
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war fathers bury their sons.9 sons cannot replace their fathers, but fathers can 
have more sons. If they or their children or both do not accept the result of a 
previous conflict as final, they need only wait until their respective sons reach 
the age to fight alongside their fathers, brothers, and other kin in the next round 
of conflict. Hence, in the sentence immediately after describing the terms of the 
thirty year Peace, thucydides calls it a “truce” (1.115). 
like the Peace of Nicias, it merely bought time for each side to renew the con-
flict under more auspicious circumstances. Indeed, within six years of signing the 
treaty a key ally of athens, samos, rebelled, compelling athens, led by Pericles, to 
engage in a long, costly, and brutal siege to recover it. significantly, the Pelopon-
nesian league was divided over whether to use this opportunity to force athens 
into a two-front war, with sparta probably supporting going to war at that time 
but Corinth dissenting. as the Corinthians later reminded the athenians, were it 
not for their dissent the second Peloponnesian War might well have started over 
samos in 441 rather than over Corcyra, Potidaea, and Megara in 431 (1.41).10 so 
the athenians knew there was a high probability that any time a significant ally 
rebelled or was instigated to rebel by the Peloponnesians, athens would have 
another multitheater war on its hands.
In other words, “It ain’t over ’til it’s over,” and in ancient greece, war was never 
over. one might well debate whether thucydides’s greatest translator, thomas 
Hobbes, was right to say that the natural state of mankind is a state of war. one 
might even debate whether he was right to conclude that international relations, 
there being no opportunity to exit the state of nature, are by definition a state of 
war too. but he was certainly right about the ancient greeks: their natural and 
normal state was war, not peace, 
for Warre, consisteth not in battel onely, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time, 
wherein the Will to contend in battell is sufficiently known: and the notion of Time, 
is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as in the nature of Weather. for as the na-
ture of foule weather, lyeth not in a shower or two of rain; but an inclination thereto 
of many dayes together: so the nature of War, consisteth not in actual fighting; but 
in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the 
contrary. all other time is PeaCe.11
the final component of thucydides’s argument that the truest cause of the war 
was sparta’s fear of the growing power of athens is rooted in efforts by athens, 
Corinth, and ultimately sparta itself to continue the first Peloponnesian War by 
indirect means and proxies. one proxy was Corcyra, an island off the northwest-
ern coast of greece in the Ionian sea, the other Potidaea, a city on the Chalcidic 
Peninsula, in the aegean sea in northeastern greece. Corinth was at the center of 
both controversies. epidamnus, a colony of Corcyra on the adriatic, underwent 
9
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one of the revolutions common in ancient greece, with the popular party exil-
ing the oligarchic one. the oligarchs sought aid from local barbarian tribes and 
began to wage an insurgency to get their city back. finding itself in need of for-
eign aid, the popular party asked for help from the mother country, but Corcyra 
refused. the popular party then sought aid from Corinth, which had established 
Corcyra originally as its own colony and now deeply resented it for taking an in-
dependent, isolationist foreign policy—that is, for rejecting Corinth’s traditional 
hegemony in northwestern greece (1.25). Probably as a way to restore that hege-
mony, Corinth was all too happy to help the popular party in epidamnus, but its 
efforts to do so alarmed the Corcyreans. With the third-largest fleet in greece, 
the Corcyreans were able to defeat Corinth, which had the second-largest fleet, 
and Corinth’s allies at the battle of leukimme (1.26). Humiliated, the Corinthians 
sought revenge and began to build a bigger navy and called on all their allies for 
aid, with those allies forming inside the Peloponnesian league a coalition per-
haps more likely to follow the lead of Corinth than of sparta (1.27). seeing the 
naval balance turn against them, the Corcyreans appealed to athens, the largest 
naval power, with an offer of an alliance. 
What made their appeal an offer the athenians could not refuse? Ideally, in 
their view, Corcyra and Corinth might wear out each other’s navies, thus leaving 
athens in a stronger position relative to both (1.49). but what if Corcyra lost? 
In ancient greece, naval battles did not depend so much on sinking ships as on 
disabling them, often by stripping their oars.12 the victor often gained control of 
the defeated belligerent’s ships, towed them to port, and repaired them for com-
bat again. If Corinth defeated Corcyra, it might gain control of all or most of the 
latter’s navy, thus tipping the naval balance against athens, which needed control 
of the sea to feed itself in wartime and raise tribute within its empire. otherwise, 
with an undefeated Corcyra as an ally athens would substantially increase its na-
val power, but for what purpose? Containing Corinth was surely part of the story, 
but so too, thucydides made clear, were Italy and sicily, not as projects of im-
mediate expansion but as somewhat vague yet highly passionate and deeply held 
aspirations to be achieved when opportunity knocked (1.33–36, 1.44). during the 
first Peloponnesian War, the athenians had set up at Nisaea, Pegae, achaea, and 
Naupactus bases that would have enabled them to expand toward the west. fear 
of westward athenian expansion was surely part of Corinth’s hostility to athens; 
denying Corinth the use of Corcyra as a base was also essential if athens meant 
to compete with Corinth for influence in Italy and sicily. 
as the Corcyreans pointed out, an alliance with them would not violate the 
letter of the thirty year Peace. that treaty prohibited athens and sparta from 
poaching members of each other’s alliance, but since Corcyra had been neutral 
and isolationist, genuinely impartial arbitration would not prove athens had 
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violated the treaty. so an alliance with Corcyra gave athens the chance of gaining 
the fruits of a major military victory without giving the Peloponnesians a legiti-
mate cause of war (1.35). athenian diplomacy under Pericles thus appears to have 
been following a sun tzuian strategy to “subdue the enemy without fighting,” an 
approach that the eastern sage called the “acme of skill,” more so even than win-
ning “a hundred battles.”13 although the athenians initially rejected the offer of 
an alliance, in a subsequent assembly meeting they accepted a merely defensive 
arrangement, supplying strict rules of engagement to their commanders not to 
interfere in Corcyra’s war with Corinth unless Corcyra itself was endangered. In 
theory, the defensive alliance would deter Corinth, thus giving athens the fruits 
of military victory without war. this was a diplomatic gamble with high rewards 
but no less high risks. If Corinth was in fact deterred by the athenian alliance 
with Corcyra, escalation would stop and athens’ position in western greece 
would improve enormously. athens would have taken a huge step toward revising 
the thirty year Peace without having to fight a war. Unfortunately for athens, 
Corinth was not deterred and began to succeed against its former colony. Corinth 
began to win a naval battle at sybota, thus drawing the athenian navy into com-
bat to save Corcyra’s navy, in turn making possible escalation to a great-power 
war with Corinth’s ally, sparta (1.44–54).14 
still, there was no declared war yet. In part because Corinth relied on “volun-
teers,” this conflict was still seen as a private one between Corcyra and Corinth, 
not between the rival alliances (1.26). yet it would be wrong to say the second 
Peloponnesian War had not yet begun. the Corinthians warned the athenians 
that an alliance with Corcyra would mean war with them and eventually their al-
lies (1.42). thinking such war was inevitable, many athenians thought it best for 
war to begin with Corcyra as an ally rather than a neutral vulnerable to Corinth 
(1.40–42, 1.44). true to their word, the Corinthians began to sponsor a rebellion 
in athens’ tribute-paying ally Potidaea. once again, in an exercise of “plausible 
deniability,” Corinth sent volunteers, so no one could say it was directing the affair 
and dragging the Peloponnesian league into a major war. significantly, represen-
tatives from Potidaea convinced the spartan authorities to promise to invade at-
tica once their rebellion began (1.58). the spartans’ promise put their credibility 
at stake, with huge implications for the viability of the Peloponnesian league.
from this perspective, the famous debate in sparta that in thucydides’s nar-
rative followed immediately on these events looks like a controversy less about 
whether to go to war than whether to escalate an ongoing war.15 after all, the 
spartans were planning on invading attica even before the debate began, thus 
helping us understand why thucydides believed the stated grievances in the 
debates were not as important as the underlying causes of the war. Corinthian 
representatives present egged on the spartans, arguing that the entire balance 
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of power, understood in social as well as geopolitical terms, was tipping against 
them: spartans had to act soon, before it was too late to check the athenians, 
whose diplomatic gamble all sides’ leaders understood completely (1.70–71). Just 
in case the spartans did not get the point, however, the Corinthians concluded 
their speech with a demand that sparta “assist your allies and Potidaea, in par-
ticular, as you promised, by a speedy invasion of attica” and “not sacrifice friends 
and kindred to their bitterest enemies, and drive the rest of us in despair to some 
other alliance” (1.71). this threat to leave the Peloponnesian league may have 
been hollow, but apparently the spartans did not think they could afford to call 
the Corinthians’ bluff, perhaps especially since the Corinthians suggested they 
would take other allies with them. 
Ironically, the unnamed athenian envoys whose speech followed the Corin-
thians’ probably only fanned the flames of war in sparta, though that was not 
their intent. they meant to show the power of athens and thus to deter the 
spartans; instead, their speech proved highly provocative. they declared that the 
athenians were compelled by the three strongest passions in human nature (fear, 
honor, and interest) to acquire their empire, sustain it, and expand it. anyone 
else, they claimed, would have done the same thing, for “it has always been the 
law that the weaker should be subject to the stronger” (1.76). If Corinth was right 
to argue that athens’ power was growing rapidly—through the alliance with 
Corcyra, for example—the envoys’ defense of the athenian empire merely proved 
the danger it posed to the weak, whom it would subject when opportunity was 
ripe. Not for the last time, the athenians, by frank presentation of Machtpolitik, 
undermined their diplomatic objectives. Quite unintentionally, they confirmed 
the worst nightmares of everyone present. because they thought it was natural 
and inevitable for the strong to rule the weak, the athenians would expand until 
they met equal or superior strength, thus also confirming the Corinthian envoys’ 
portrait of the athenians as a people “who were born into the world to take no 
rest themselves and give none to others” (1.70). Not surprisingly, then, the major-
ity of spartans at the assembly voted that the “athenians were open aggressors, 
and that war must be declared at once” (1.79). 
still, the spartan king archidamus, who was “reputed to be wise and moder-
ate,” tried to prevent further escalation, if only because the moment was not aus-
picious, not least from the diplomatic and legal points of view. the athenians had 
concluded their speech by warning the spartans not to break the treaty or violate 
their oaths but to go to arbitration first, thus suggesting the spartans would oth-
erwise assume responsibility for violating the peace (1.78). archidamus did not 
want that responsibility without sufficient moral and legal justification, however. 
It might prove difficult to sustain support for the war within sparta and among its 
allies, and to whatever extent he may have been pious, he might have wondered 
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about the reaction of the gods. Indeed, thucydides reports much later, doubts 
that sparta had a just cause for the war or that it had begun in a just manner (in 
a surprise attack on Plataea by thebes, a spartan ally) had a detrimental impact 
on spartan morale for much of the war. the spartans actually believed they de-
served their misfortunes, that the gods were punishing them for their injustice 
(1.85, 6.105, 7.18). 
so archidamus now tried to delay offensive action until the spartans had a 
better pretext for war, meanwhile gathering allies among both greeks and barbar-
ians, raising money, and developing some form of naval power—to buy time for 
a long war in multiple theaters that he did not think sparta could win with the 
resources and justification at hand (1.80–82). that he feared the spartans might 
leave the war as a “legacy to our children” should give the lie to all claims that he 
at least expected to win quickly through a battle of annihilation on land (1.81). 
Invading attica could aid allies like Corinth and Potidaea but was unlikely to 
win the war. He had to order early invasions of attica, yet he doubted they would 
prove decisive. He “hoped” the athenians would commit the blunder of fighting 
the invaders outside their walls (2.20), though his first speech explained that such 
a hope was entirely unrealistic: “Never let us be elated by the fatal hope of the war 
being quickly ended by a devastation of their lands” (1.81). 
In light of Corinth’s threat to defect from the Peloponnesian league unless 
sparta took “speedy” action (1.71), however, the king’s reputation for wisdom in 
this particular case appears to exceed his actual merits. archidamus had a clear 
grasp of the likely stalemate the war would produce, sparta’s need for foreign 
aid (from Persia especially), and sparta’s need to acquire naval power to inspire 
revolts among athenian allies so as to break the likely stalemate—all of which 
would take time (1.82–83). yet it was the spartan ephor (elected leader) sthene-
laidas, who comes off as an angry demagogue, who got the Corinthian message 
completely. It was “put up or shut up” time. the spartans could “neither allow 
the further aggrandizement of athens, nor betray our allies to ruin,” because the 
surest way by which athens could expand was by picking off sparta’s allies one 
by one (1.86). 
If athenian strategy was to destroy the Peloponnesian league, the best strat-
egy for sparta was to defend the league by keeping its promises to its allies, before 
it lost them, even if that meant going to war before sparta was fully prepared. 
such, at least, was thucydides’s view: “the growth of athenian power could no 
longer be ignored” by the spartans, because “their own confederacy became the 
object of its encroachments” (1.118). the problem was that sparta’s fear was not 
a sufficient legal or moral rationale for war, which helps to explain the fumbling 
and hilarious way in which the spartans sought to make the struggle a holy war, 
so to speak. they demanded that the athenians “cast out the curse” of a goddess 
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the athenians were said to have offended (1.126). deftly, the athenians under 
Pericles, who was implicated by ancestry in the curse and was unwilling to give 
up the leverage of arbitration, refused to give the spartans a religious pretext for 
war and told them to cast out their own curse (1.128). 
thucydides did not say all we would like to know about the origins of the 
second Peloponnesian War. In particular, he said little or nothing about the 
character and strength of parties in both athens and sparta for and against revis-
ing the thirty year Peace, though there is evidence they existed. the problem is 
that estimating their influence can be only a matter of speculation, especially in 
sparta, for which written records are few.16 Nonetheless, thucydides succeeded 
in demonstrating that there was more than ample reason for sparta to fear the 
growth of athenian power enough to be willing to go to war, which was his pri-
mary purpose. Not only was athens a de facto island, invulnerable to spartan 
land power. Not only did every day of peace favor athens, as it became stronger 
through wealth and tribute. Not only did each passing day give the athenians 
time to build ever more ships and train crews to project their power wherever 
their ships could go. Not only had the athenians announced publicly that they 
considered it natural and inevitable for the strong to rule the weak, with the 
implication that they would rule wherever they were strong. Not only had the 
athenians crushed rebels, like thasos and samos, time and time again, thus 
demonstrating what would happen to the victims of their power. Not only had 
the athenians used the letter of the arbitration clause in the thirty year Peace to 
undermine the spirit of the treaty and to expand to Corcyra and potentially far 
beyond in the west, where no one in the Peloponnesian league had ever intended 
they should go. they had also crossed a red line, by putting such pressure on 
spartan allies, Corinth and its followers, that sparta had to go to war to aid them 
or risk having fewer allies or even none at all. at that point even its marvelous 
hoplite army might prove vulnerable to an expanded athenian alliance, including 
perhaps some of sparta’s most important traditional allies. 
ii
thucydides’s stress on sparta’s fear of losing allies is essential to understanding 
each side’s war aims, the strategies each developed pursuant to them, and why it 
would be extraordinarily difficult for either side to make a peace it regarded as 
final. sparta had both minimum and maximum goals, which correspond loosely 
to what Clausewitzians call “limited” and “unlimited” war objectives.17 sparta’s 
immediate and minimum objective was to save its alliance by aiding its allies, 
who might be appeased if sparta persuaded athens to leave them alone and re-
turn to something like the thirty year Peace. this explains why lifting the siege 
of Potidaea and repealing the Megarian decree, which denied the Megarians the 
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ability to trade with the delian league, were part of the spartan ultimatums and 
pretexts for war	(1.139). If athens complied, sparta could satisfy its allies without 
fighting athens. If possible, however, sparta aimed also to “break” the power of 
athens, which would require athens to “let the Hellenes be independent” (1.118, 
1.139). this final ultimatum escalated from the more moderate ones regarding 
Megara, Potidaea, and aegina and from earlier religious pretexts for war. Com-
pliance would require the athenians to disband the delian league, which would 
reverse the previous peace settlement to the status quo before the Persian Wars, 
when sparta had been the clear hegemon in greece—an ambitious objective for 
which sparta and its allies clearly and simply lacked the means. as a pretext for 
war, demanding that athens free the greeks was nonetheless useful strategically 
for sparta. freeing the greeks was most certainly as much public diplomacy, 
or what we today call “strategic communication,” as an objective for sparta. 
all greeks, except the athenians, could be united behind freeing other greeks 
from athens. like the atlantic Charter in World War II, this slogan expressed 
principles enormously helpful for building an extended coalition in a protracted 
multitheater war and bought sparta much sympathy as the liberator of greece 
throughout the Hellenic world (2.8). 
at a minimum, sparta had to stop athens from poaching on its allies. In the 
best case, however, it would seek to overthrow the athenian empire—but how? 
as the king of siam says in the broadway musical The King and i, that “is a puz-
zlement.” for all the reasons explained by archidamus previously, sparta had no 
direct way of challenging athenian power. secure behind the walls, able to feed 
themselves by sea, and with a navy to ensure the allies did their bidding and paid 
their dues, the athenians could wage a protracted war, even indefinitely. they 
could wait the spartans out. all sparta would be able to do would be to invade 
attica, which the athenians, since the time of themistocles, had been willing to 
give up until the invader went home. as archidamus understood, spartan victory 
would depend on things and events spartans could not control and over which 
they had little influence: ships and money from allies, including cities in sicily 
and Italy and the Persians (who were unlikely to intervene as long as athens was 
dominant at sea); rebellions within the delian league; and above all else, athe-
nian mistakes, which Pericles was determined to prevent (1.82–83). all of sparta’s 
prospects were based on hope, though hope is not a strategy. obliged to save 
their alliance, the spartans were trapped in the most unenviable position—they 
would have to prosecute a war without a clear strategy for victory, pouncing when 
opportunity arose, which, given the slow and ponderous character of spartans, 
was almost as unlikely as athenian errors that would give the spartans the op-
portunity to win (1.70, 2.65).
15
Walling: Thucydides on Policy, Strategy, and War Termination
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
 6 2  Nava l  Wa r  C o l l e g e  r e v I e W
as for the athenians, their immediate and minimum aims were cautious, 
their ultimate and maximum ones grandiose, indeed simply utopian. their aims 
reflect the character of the athenian statesman Pericles, who sought great things 
through calibrated measures (though the tension between his ambition and his 
caution has led to a great deal of confusion about his strategy, especially among 
those who study strategy professionally). as Platias and Koliopoulos observe, 
there is a difference between strategy proper, primarily dealing with military ac-
tivity, which is the principal subject of Clausewitz, and grand strategy, including 
the usual diplomatic, economic, and intelligence activities by which states seek to 
achieve their objectives before, during, and after actual hostilities, a subject sun 
tzu investigated somewhat more.18 Most accounts of Pericles as a strategist focus 
on his minimum objective to hold on to the athenian empire, but offer a merely 
military conception of his strategy. they stress how he employed the athenian 
army and navy once hostilities broke out and conclude that he meant to wage a 
strategy of exhaustion. from this point of view, he meant to win by not losing, 
holding out behind the walls of athens, maintaining control of the sea, avoiding 
direct battle with Peloponnesian ground forces of equal or greater strength, keep-
ing the Peloponnesians off balance and lifting morale at home with raids on the 
Peloponnesus, and avoiding new wars of conquest while still at war with sparta 
and the Peloponnesian league.19 
What is left out of this approach is the diplomacy by which especially Pericles 
meant not merely to preserve but also to grow the athenian empire.20 Without 
that component, accounts of Pericles’s strategy are one-sided, cartoon-like cari-
catures of the real thing. Without attention to Pericles’s prewar diplomacy, his 
military strategy is disconnected from his grand strategy in such a way as to ob-
scure his ultimate objectives and how he meant to achieve them. the lesson that 
Pericles took from the first Peloponnesian War was, not to refrain from further 
expansion when circumstances permitted, but to avoid the blunders athens had 
made in the first round by ensuring above all else that athens did not get over-
extended. In other words, it was not policy but strategy that he meant to change. 
among other things, this change included the use of diplomacy, often seen 
as an alternative to war, as a continuation of war by other means. this applied 
especially to the requirement in the thirty year Peace treaty that quarrels be-
tween the delian and Peloponnesian leagues be settled by arbitration, with a 
“legalistic interpretation of the arbitration clause to disguise an athenian bid for 
domination.”21 thucydides’s distinction between the stated and truest causes of 
the war is, among other things, an admonition to beware statesmen who, often 
because their motives are not publicly defensible, conceal them. Ironically, just 
as sparta disguised a defensive war to preserve its alliance as an offensive war to 
free the greeks, so too did athens under Pericles disguise an offensive diplomatic 
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initiative to expand the empire as a defensive effort to preserve the thirty year 
Peace. academic realists have often admired thucydides for stressing sparta’s 
fear of athens’ growth, but a genuine realist, paying attention to what Clausewitz 
called the “moral factors” (which he claimed constituted more than half of real 
strength), must take his hat off to thucydides for showing how and why both 
sides considered it necessary at least to appear to hold the moral high ground.22 
Precisely because athens had not violated the letter of the thirty year Peace 
in allying with Corcyra, Pericles knew athens was unlikely to lose in any impar-
tial effort to settle the disputes through arbitration. because the alliance was not 
compatible with the spirit of the treaty, however, it was also entirely predictable 
that Corinth would seek spartan aid in response. Whether sparta went to war or 
not, athens had a good chance to break out of the containment against westward 
expansion established under the thirty year Peace. since Pericles was no fool, 
he must have assumed Corinth would threaten to defect unless sparta went to 
war. If Corinth left the Peloponnesian league, athenian power relative to the 
Peloponnesian league (Pericles’s primary adversary) would grow diplomatically, 
not merely through the alliance with Corcyra but also by dividing sparta from 
Corinth, its chief and wealthiest ally and the only one with a significant navy, 
and, not least important, by reducing its access to northern greece. If sparta and 
the other Peloponnesian cities did go to war against athens, however, but proved 
incapable of aiding Corinth effectively against Corcyra and sparta so found itself 
compelled to make peace at some later date, athens might still succeed at divid-
ing the Peloponnesians. there was a good chance that not merely Corinth but 
also other important spartan allies, like thebes and Megara, would find sparta 
useless for their own purposes. they might even feel betrayed by sparta, as in fact 
they would immediately after the Peace of Nicias, and begin to form their own 
alliance, possibly including argos, leaving sparta so distracted by the shifting 
balance of power inside the Peloponnesus that it would be unable to act outside 
of it (5.22, 5.27). 
so whether the conflict was settled through arbitration, which was preferable, 
or through war, which was acceptable, athens could retain Corcyra, build a chain 
of bases in and outside the Crisaean gulf to get to Corcyra, and have secure com-
munications to and from Italy and sicily. all athens had to do to break up the 
Peloponnesian league and escape from its containment was outlast spartan will 
to wage war, though it might shorten the length of time it could take sparta to sue 
for peace with a judicious mix of defensive and offensive operations.
the problem is that Pericles did not explain his grand strategy publicly, though 
he did state publicly that that there was more to what he was doing than he was 
willing to say in the athenian assembly. He had many reasons to “hope for a fa-
vorable outcome,” provided athens did not make the same mistakes as in the first 
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Peloponnesian War, but, he said, he would explain his reasons later in “another 
speech,” meaning one has to look at all of his speeches to grasp the totality of his 
strategy. so we do not have to suspect that Pericles was keeping some cards close 
to his vest—he actually said so (1.144). When a statesman of his caliber deliber-
ately informs his audience he is being discreet, one needs to treat him seriously. 
to grasp his strategic vision one must look as much at what he does in power as 
at what he says. Indeed, even Pericles’s public remarks about his merely military 
strategy do not explain all he had in mind, perhaps because he did not wish to 
broadcast his intentions to enemies abroad and rivals at home on the very eve of 
the war. In his first speech, he still sought to win without fighting by demand-
ing that the Peloponnesians settle through arbitration the totality of matters in 
dispute (1.140, 1.144). that totality (from the athenian viewpoint, expanding 
via Corcyra, securing the empire against revolt at Potidaea, pressuring Megara 
to defect to the delian league through economic sanctions, etc.), however, was 
so important that, he argued, the athenians should accept the risk that the Pelo-
ponnesians would go to war rather than submit to their ultimatums. as a result, 
he stressed athenian strengths more than weaknesses in his first speech. for all 
the reasons seen by archidamus, he understood that sparta and its allies had no 
direct way to overthrow athens. the strategy of defense by land and offense by 
sea, which Pericles had inherited from themistocles, meant that athens could 
repel repeated invasions by land, control its allies, and launch attacks all around 
the Peloponnesus at targets of opportunity (1.93, 1.142).
although these early athenian offensive operations are often dismissed as 
mere raids, there has been, in the language of the 9/11 commission report, a 
substantial failure of strategic imagination, a huge failure to “connect the dots” 
to construct a strategic pattern underlying these operations.23 Consistent with 
Pericles’s caution, if athenian invaders got into trouble on land they could with-
draw by sea, so they could always limit their losses, as Wellington did in Iberia 
during the Napoleonic Wars. also, if only because they were inexperienced in 
operations in the Peloponnesus and hesitated to go too far inland, the athenians 
were none too daring and often lost opportunities, like capturing Methone early 
in the war, as a result. sooner or later, however, they might find a spartan nerve 
and gain leverage for negotiations. so to understand the offensive component of 
Pericles’s strategy of unremitting pressure on a fragile alliance, one must look at 
where the athenians operated while he was still the first man in athens and its 
leading strategist. 
the first order of strategic business was to get Megara to flip back to the de-
lian league. the athenians certainly did not fail to do so for lack of offensive 
spirit or action. Pericles led the largest land force in athenian history to capture 
Megara in 431, the first year of the war. sometimes thucydides leaves out details 
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important for understanding the strategic purpose of operations early in the 
war but mentions them much later. one example is that the athenians attacked 
Megara twice per year, sometimes with most of their hoplite army, sometimes 
only with cavalry (2.31, 4.66), meaning that this was a do-or-die objective for 
athens, which had only itself to blame for the long walls that enabled Megara to 
resist repeated assaults. In the eighth year of the war, partly with the aid of a fifth 
column, the athenians took Megara’s port at Nisaea and came within days, hours, 
or even minutes of taking the city too (4.69). Had they succeeded, they would 
have reversed much of the result of the first Peloponnesian War (and prevented 
brasidas from leading his daring spartan expedition to Chalcidice). attica would 
have been safe from invasion, sparta divided from thebes, athens enabled to ex-
pand through the Crisaean gulf, and Corinth howling mad, perhaps even angry 
enough to carry out its threat to defect from the spartan alliance. 
Under Pericles the athenians experimented, tentatively, with several other 
options as well. In the second year of the war Pericles led a hundred athenian 
ships, fifty allied ships, four thousand hoplites, and three hundred cavalry to 
epidaurus. they ravaged the territory, as usual, but also had “hopes of taking the 
city by assault” (2.56). this operation failed; the epidaurians closed their gates 
and the athenians left in a hurry, perhaps for fear of the arrival of spartan ground 
forces. still, the failed operation points toward a more imaginative strategy than 
commonly ascribed to Pericles. once again, thucydides does not make clear the 
strategic purpose of this operation when it happened. one has to connect the 
dots. In the thirteenth year of the war, argos sought to capture epidaurus for the 
explicit purpose of ensuring the neutrality of Corinth and giving the athenians 
“shorter passage for their reinforcements” (5.55) to argos, meaning argos and 
athens understood that epidaurus was vital for joining their forces against sparta 
and neutralizing Corinth. Had athens taken epidaurus, the athenian-argive al-
liance that almost defeated sparta in 418 might well have begun in the second, 
not the fourteenth, year of the war, with Pericles rather than alcibiades in com-
mand and no Nicias to obstruct going for the spartan jugular or forcing Corinth 
out of the war.
as Pericles had suggested before the war, the athenians could also fortify a 
base, whether at Methone (while he was still alive), at Pylos (after his death), 
or elsewhere in sparta, to support a revolt of the Helots, with essential aid from 
the Messenian exiles at Naupactus (1.142, 2.25, 4.3–15). this would force sparta 
into a two-front war, which, given its relative poverty, it could afford much less 
than athens. Under Pericles, the athenians also sought to bottle up Corinth and 
secure their lines of communications to Corcyra and beyond by gaining control 
of low-hanging fruit—islands off the coast of the Peloponnesus like Zacynthus 
and Cephallenia (2.7), thus adding pressure on Corinth to go its own way and 
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leave sparta in the lurch. Certainly to secure their rear, but perhaps also to obtain 
much-needed new ground forces, the athenians under Pericles also allied with 
both the Macedonians and the thracians (2.29), though they turned out to be 
unreliable to say the least. 
It is not at all surprising that these early efforts to seize the strategic initiative 
were operational failures, or conversely, that the spartans were slow to compete 
with the athenians at sea, where the athenians had the upper hand. each side 
was experimenting, cautiously, with fighting in its opponent’s element. the athe-
nians were learning on the fly how to operate in hostile Peloponnesian territory 
at a time when the prestige of sparta’s hoplite army was near its peak. Had some 
or all of these operations panned out while Pericles was still alive, however, the 
spartans might well have had to negotiate peace, and the athenians could have 
asked for some or all of the gains they had lost under the thirty year Peace— 
Nisaea, Pegae, troezen, and achaea—as Cleon would later do when the fortunes 
of war turned more in athenian favor (4.21). the second Peloponnesian War 
would have overturned the settlement of the first. If it had, the route to expansion 
in the west would have been clear. operational failure, in other words, is no proof 
of a failure of strategic imagination on the part of Pericles. as is true also of the 
failure of the spartans to use their fledgling navy effectively to support revolts 
against athens on the island of lesbos (3.25–35), operational failure was simply 
the most likely beginning in the asymmetric struggle between athenian sea and 
spartan land power, when neither side had either the confidence, the experience, 
or the commanders to gain decisive results. 
Pericles’s ultimate objectives were substantially more ambitious than most stu-
dents of strategy today are wont to admit. virtually unlimited expansion was not 
on the minds only of the athenians under Pericles when they made the alliance 
with Corcyra, with Italy and sicily the ultimate prize. It was emphatically part of 
Pericles’s ambition too. this war escalates not merely militarily but also rhetori-
cally. Pericles’s first speech is cautious; his second proud, defiant, and hubristic; 
his last over the top in a manner that explains why his ward alcibiades, despite his 
recklessness, was Pericles’s natural heir, the one who best understood that Pericles 
along with many others had been thinking about Italy and sicily from the begin-
ning, just not ready to go west until he had broken up the Peloponnesian league. 
In Pericles’s final speech to the athenians he put on the table some of the cards 
he had refused to show in his first speech. With the athenians suffering from 
plague and clamoring for peace, he sought to bolster their spirits. He chose to 
“reveal an advantage arising from the greatness of your dominion, which I think 
has never suggested itself to you”—or apparently many students of this war either 
—“and which I never mentioned in my previous speeches.” the “visible field of 
action” in the war had “two parts, land and sea. In the whole of one of these, you 
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are completely supreme, not merely as far as you use it at present, but also to 
what further extent you may think fit: in fine, your naval resources are such that 
your naval vessels may go anywhere they please, without the King” of Persia “or 
any other nation being able to stop them” (2.62). that was how Pericles sought to 
prevent the athenians from making a premature peace in a moment of weakness, 
by dangling the opportunity of unlimited maritime empire before them. It was 
because of this seemingly unlimited ability to go anywhere in the Mediterranean 
world by sea that the athenians “held rule over more Hellenes than any other 
Hellenic state.” Not merely to hold such rule but to gain more of it, and with it 
“the greatest name in the world,” a name that would live forever, was the ultimate 
goal of Periclean policy and strategy (2.64). 
such a goal might seem preposterous to modern americans, whose democrat-
ic ethos makes them uncomfortable with and suspicious of those who wear their 
desire for glory on their sleeves. since the age of george Washington, americans 
have preferred that their statesmen and generals cloak their ambition, however 
great, with humility. Worse still, Clausewitz’s effort to understand war as it ought 
to be, as a potentially rational human endeavor, sometimes inclines strategists 
who have learned from him to ignore war as it often is, the product of deeply irra-
tional forces in human nature, including the ancient desire to prove superiority to 
everyone else and thereby gain a kind of immortality through fame. In that way, 
both the modern democratic ethos and the Clausewitzian approach to politics 
and war can combine to blind us to the true objectives of belligerents, for any 
account of war in the ancient greek world from the age of Homer to alexander 
the great that leaves out honor, fame, and glory as motives of both leaders and 
citizens is inconsistent with what it meant to be greek.
In that way our ethos and our analytical tools can lead us to fail to understand 
the true character of the conflict, though Clausewitz himself claimed that gain-
ing such understanding is the first, the supreme, the farthest-reaching act of 
judgment for any war, the one essential to understanding everything else.24 so an 
idealized version of Clausewitz applied as a template to thucydides can wind up 
distorting the latter’s account, turning it into what we think it ought to be, not 
what it was in fact. the problem is not in Clausewitz but in his readers’ failure 
to understand thucydides on his own terms. to avoid distorting the war to suit 
our times and our ways of studying strategy, we have to get beyond how we today 
respond to the call to glory. We have to understand the deadly seriousness of 
Pericles in expressing, quintessentially, the ruling passion for power and glory 
among the greeks.25
thucydides concluded his eulogy of Pericles by stressing the “easy triumph” 
Pericles foresaw over the “unaided forces of the Peloponnesians,” meaning that 
Pericles’s strategy was to deal with the Peloponnesians first, others later (2.65). 
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His confidence was not unfounded. so long as he could prevent third-party in-
tervention, he had grounds to think the Peloponnesian league would crumble 
over time. Under no circumstances did he want a war with the Peloponnesians 
and with other powers—like egypt, Persia, or sicily—at the same time, which 
would have been to repeat the great blunder of the first Peloponnesian War. 
Pericles towers above his successors not because thucydides had unlimited re-
gard for him or failed to recognize something deeply flawed and highly unstable 
in his unique blend of caution and ambition. the only statesman or general who 
receives anything like unlimited praise from thucydides is themistocles, the 
founder of the strategy of defense by land and offense by sea (1.138); Pericles 
was not in the same league. but Pericles was unlikely, had he not died in 429, to 
have tried to expand the empire until his strategy to break up the Peloponnesian 
league was fully accomplished—that is, until it would have been possible to ex-
pand in relative safety from the threat of a multifront war. 
Nonetheless, Pericles’s grand vision of a Mediterranean empire was utopian, 
for the simple reason that tiny athens could never generate the resources re-
quired to preserve maritime hegemony in the Mediterranean sea even if it gained 
it.26 the more athens expanded, the weaker it would become and the more 
vulnerable it would be to efforts by sparta or some other power to tie it down 
in a multitheater war. Indeed, even the cautious side of Pericles’s strategy, based 
on outlasting sparta, was almost equally utopian, because the athenians, who 
could neither rest nor give rest to others, were the wrong people to execute it, if 
any people could have. retreating behind walls called for qualities of character 
inconsistent with athenian society and culture, perhaps even with human nature 
itself. the athenians, a people of seemingly limitless enterprise and energy, could 
not be patient. Pericles had enormous difficulty preventing them from fighting in 
open battle outside the city’s walls, where they were almost certain to be defeated 
by the superior spartans and their allies (2.21). He had even greater difficulty 
convincing them not to make a premature peace during the plague, which may 
have killed almost a third of the athenian people. When Pericles himself died 
of the plague, his successors—each quarreling over different pieces of the strat-
egy, with some, like Nicias, embracing his caution and others, like Cleon and 
alcibiades, seeking to fulfill his grandiose ambition—proved incapable of putting 
Humpty-dumpty back together again (2.65). 
iii
In light of these policies and strategies within sparta and athens, it was going 
to be very difficult to bring the second Peloponnesian War to an end, and not 
for want of trying. to see why, consider three different thucydidean accounts 
of war termination between athens and the Peloponnesians in the second 
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Peloponnesian War. the first attempt occurred during the plague, when athens 
was down but not out; the second after athenian victories at Pylos and sphacte-
ria, when sparta in its turn was down but, again, not out. the last occurred 
after the spartan victories in Chalcidice, at amphipolis especially, and athenian 
defeat on land in boeotia at the battle of delium. In the last instance both sides 
were down, but each had some leverage over the other and so could bargain and 
negotiate. 
In contrast to his ample detail about the symptoms of the plague in athens, 
thucydides is surprisingly reticent about the peace talks for which the plague was 
the major contributing cause. thucydides introduces his account of the plague 
immediately after Pericles’s funeral oration, itself noteworthy for present pur-
poses for its discussion of the accomplishments and ambitions of different athe-
nian generations and for its demands on athenian women, mothers especially. 
Pericles called attention to the grandparents in his audience, the ones who had 
fought at Marathon and salamis, thus saving greece—perhaps all of europe—
from Persian rule. He also called attention to the parents in his audience, the ones 
who had established the athenian empire throughout the aegean (2.36). 
His central theme, however, was the current generation of athenians and the 
beauty, nobility, power, and greatness of their city, including (but by no means 
limited to) their free way of life. What could the younger generation do to equal 
or surpass its ancestors? since the subject of the funeral oration was not de-
mocracy as such but the fame of being an athenian, and thus the immortality 
of name that might compensate for mortality in combat, that question needed 
to be addressed. great things do not come from puny efforts. as Pericles had 
said earlier (1.143), the athenians could not pine over the loss of their homes 
and farms and ancestral gods as the spartans ravaged attica. Merely to equal 
the heroes of salamis they would have to be willing to abandon all these things, 
as themistocles had advised them to do when he developed the strategy of the 
long walls (1.93). they would have to understand that when athenians died in 
battle they gained immortality. Hence, the few (so far) who had fallen in combat 
“received the renown which never grows old, and for a tomb, not so much that in 
which their bodies have been deposited, but that noblest of shrines wherein their 
glory is laid up to be eternally remembered upon every occasion on which deed 
or story shall be commemorated” (2.43). since they had purchased immortality 
with their lives, their sacrifices were not losses at all but gains for themselves as 
individuals and for athenians collectively.
significantly, if any athenian desired glory beyond that of his grandparents and 
his parents, it would not be enough to preserve what had already been acquired. 
as abraham lincoln explained at the springfield young Men’s lyceum in 1838, 
the young may earn respect but not glory by perpetuating the accomplishments 
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of their forebears. the most ambitious, the ones who belong to “the family of the 
lion” and “the tribe of the eagle”—like alexander, Caesar, Napoleon, and, one 
must add, alcibiades—aspire to much more than perpetuating other people’s 
glory. “towering genius disdains a beaten path. It seeks regions hitherto unex-
plored. It sees no distinction in adding story to story, upon the monuments of 
fame, erected in the memory of others. . . . It scorns to tread in the footsteps of 
any predecessor, however illustrious. It thirsts and burns for distinction; and if 
possible, it will have it, whether at the expense of emancipating slaves [lincoln’s 
eventual role] or enslaving freemen [the role the athenians chose].”27 greeks were 
agonistic (that is, competitive), especially with each other, and especially for that 
highest term of praise in Homer, “godlike.” If the members of the current genera-
tion were to engage in a competition with each other, and with their ancestors, 
to be like the gods, they would have to go and do something significant where 
no athenian had gone or done anything remarkable before, which would not be 
easy. Pericles boasted that they had already “forced every sea and land to be the 
highway of our daring, and everywhere, whether for good [to friends] or evil [to 
enemies], have left imperishable monuments behind us” (2.41). 
their parents had already built the empire in the east. so the best chance of 
earning immortal fame for the current generation was in gaining an empire in the 
west—that is, in revising the thirty year Peace on terms that in time might more 
than double the size of the athenian empire. such an accomplishment would 
more than compensate for the casualties; indeed, even if athens failed, it might 
earn glory merely for having braved so much. “Comfort, therefore, not condo-
lence,” is what Pericles had to offer the parents of the dead, for “fortunate indeed 
are they who draw for their lot a death so glorious as that which caused [their 
parents’] mourning” (2.44). In light of that good fortune, the best that could be 
done, by those capable of it, for the dead, for themselves, and for athens, whose 
interests were presumably all in harmony, was to have more children, who could 
grow up to fight for athens and continue the cycle of aspiring for glory, to be like 
the gods, by risking all in combat—that is, through endless war (2.44). Perhaps 
unintentionally, and quite tragically, Pericles, whose strategy depended on cali-
brated steps toward a larger goal, in the funeral oration found it necessary to 
boost morale by getting the athenians drunk on ambition. the elder statesman 
could hold his liquor, but not his younger successors.
the plague did not show up in athens an hour, a day, or a week after Pericles 
gave this challenge to athenians to gain immortal fame in endless competition; 
it came half a year later. but thucydides deliberately inserted his account of the 
plague immediately after the speech. Perhaps the main reason thucydides’s ac-
count of the plague occurs where it does in his narrative is to remind us that there 
is a limit to our ability to be heroes and sacrifice for a presumably common good. 
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as Clausewitz observed, the sacrifices demanded in time of war can pass the 
culminating point of social tolerance. one reason wars never or rarely become 
absolutely “total” is that “in most cases a policy of maximum exertion would fail 
because of the domestic problems it would cause.”28 the contrast between what 
Pericles asked of athenians when facing death and what they actually did when 
they all thought they had been sentenced to an agonizing death by disease is 
striking, and intentional. among other things, athenians ceased to care about 
funeral rites, sometimes having “recourse to the most shameless modes of burial,” 
such as throwing bodies on top of funeral pyres meant for others and then run-
ning away. Perseverance “in what men call honor was popular with none, it was 
so uncertain they would be spared to obtain the object.” the athenians lost all 
“fear of gods or law of man. . . . as for the first, they judged it to be just the same 
whether they worshipped them or not, as they saw all alike perishing; and for 
the last, no one expected to live to be brought to trial for his offenses[,] . . . and 
before they fell it was only reasonable to enjoy life a little” (2.52–53). In times like 
those—apparently the “end days,” as fundamentalists might say today—it was 
only natural for the people to swing to extremes, from irreligion and hedonism 
to superstition. so some consulted oracles and blamed the plague on the war and 
on those, like Pericles, who had convinced them, walled and crammed inside the 
city with little shelter (like refugees from Hurricane Katrina in the New orleans 
superdome in 2005), to accept the war rather than submit to sparta’s ultimatums. 
Hawks like Pericles became increasingly unpopular as a result, but amazingly, 
after losing as many citizens to the plague as they were likely to have lost in a 
protracted war, the athenians kept up the fight, trying to take epidaurus, attack-
ing troezen, Halieis, and Hermione, and reinforcing the besiegers at Potidaea 
(who had also caught the plague) (2.56–57). at the same time, however, having 
endured perhaps more than human nature can bear, they “became eager to come 
to terms with sparta, and actually sent ambassadors thither who however did not 
succeed in their mission” (2.59). 
thucydides does not explain the failure of this peace mission. We can make 
only intelligent inferences. the plague had put the athenians in a world of pain, 
and the spartans knew it. If all the spartans had asked for was a return to the sta-
tus quo ante, the fighting might have stopped, but the war would not have ended. 
the result would not have been final, because once the pressure of the annual 
invasions of attica was off, the athenians would have returned to their homes in 
the suburbs, escaped the crowding of the city, recovered their health, and (fol-
lowing Pericles’s advice) had more children—that is, baby soldiers and sailors 
for the next round. also, sparta could not act as a free agent. Having escalated 
the conflict at the behest of its allies, it could not make a separate peace without 
risking their loss. 
25
Walling: Thucydides on Policy, Strategy, and War Termination
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
 7 2  Nava l  Wa r  C o l l e g e  r e v I e W
In any case, if the result was to be final, the spartans had to keep the pressure 
on, but the nature of their maximal political demand—that athens liberate the 
Hellenes by dissolving its empire—was such that the athenians could not accept 
it without committing strategic suicide. as Pericles said in his third speech, when 
he tried to dissuade athenians from making a premature peace, the empire might 
have been unjust to acquire but was imprudent to let go. “for what you hold is, to 
speak somewhat plainly, a tyranny; to take it perhaps was wrong; but to let it go 
is unsafe” (2.63). the Persians might make a comeback. athenian allies (subjects) 
might seek revenge. Without allies, athens would have had no tribute to fund 
its navy and no trade to feed itself if the Peloponnesians renewed the war, with 
bitter Corinth egging on the spartans to seek a “final solution,” such as killing all 
the men in athens and selling the women and children into slavery, as indeed 
Corinth would propose at the very end of the war.29 With their backs against the 
wall, literally on what sun tzu called “death ground,” with no choice but to keep 
fighting or die, the athenians had good reason to refuse sparta’s maximal terms.30 
Conversely, the spartans, presumably thinking athens was down for the count, 
would have had good reason to refuse possible concessions from athens, like 
lifting the embargo against Megara. so long as the maximal objectives of one side 
were incompatible with the minimal objectives of the other, a negotiated peace 
was impossible. so the war went on and on and on.
almost the inverse occurred after the great athenian victory at Pylos. after 
years of trying, the athenians struck not one but two vital nerves among the 
spartans. at Pylos the athenians had established a fortified base to support a 
rebellion of the Helots, thus forcing sparta into a two-front war, with the insur-
gency at home inclining the spartans to shut down the other front in attica. at 
sphacteria, an island off the coast of Pylos, the athenians had also managed to 
cut off 420 spartan hoplites, who could be supplied only by Helots swimming 
from the shore to the island. With these forces in danger, the spartans made an 
armistice and sent an embassy to athens offering not merely peace but an alli-
ance (4.16–21). 
Certainly, the athenians could have had peace at this time, and a far better one 
than the status quo ante, but there were two fundamental obstacles. first, Cleon, 
the “most violent man” in athens (3.36), did his best to sabotage the negotia-
tions, and second, the athenians, under the influence of Cleon, kept demanding 
more than sparta could accept. the athenians were determined to reverse the 
thirty year Peace treaty. they wanted back all that they had lost at the end of the 
first Peloponnesian War: Nisaea and Pegae, after the recovery of which it would 
probably have been only a matter of time before Megara fell and returned to the 
athenian empire; troezen, giving them a foothold on the eastern Peloponnesus 
near argos, if they chose to ally with that spartan rival in the future; and achaea, 
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at the western end of the gulf of Corinth, a foothold that (along with Naupactus) 
would have enabled them to control all communications, military and com-
mercial, to and from Corcyra, Italy, sicily, and the Crisaean gulf (4.21). Had the 
spartans accepted these demands Cleon would have earned his share of immortal 
fame as the greatest athenian statesman since themistocles, even greater than 
Pericles, so he had important personal motives (of the sort encouraged, ironically, 
by Pericles in the funeral oration) to make such demands and continue the war 
until they were accepted. 
Cleon’s objectives were consistent with the most ambitious goals of Pericles, 
though he was not as cautious or nearly as diplomatic. by refusing to negotiate 
with the spartans in secret, demanding rather that negotiations be conducted 
before the athenian assembly, Cleon was using a Wilsonian approach, based 
on “open covenants openly arrived at,” for anything but Wilsonian ends. Cleon 
put the ambassadors in an impossible situation, which may well have been his 
object. a public discussion of the terms meant that the spartans, whose envoys 
were willing to betray their allies by an alliance with athens, would lose face 
with those allies and perhaps their leadership of the Peloponnesian league. If 
breaking up the Peloponnesian league was still the primary athenian objective, 
however, Cleon ought to have accepted the spartan offer of an alliance, which 
would have pushed Corinth and its coalition inside the Peloponnesian league 
away from sparta. since a spartan king had been suspected of taking bribes from 
the athenians at the end of the first Peloponnesian War and had been exiled 
temporarily as a result, the spartan negotiators knew that accepting humiliating 
terms from the athenians might risk exile for themselves, or worse, when they 
returned home. 
More lenient terms from athens might have made a difference. Perhaps the 
athenians might have negotiated for something more than just an alliance (which 
was unlikely to last anyway). so perhaps they needed to ask for not much more 
than the spartan envoys had already offered. Had the athenians limited their 
demands to Nisaea and Pegae, for example, and done this in private, perhaps 
the spartan negotiators would have taken the risk of political embarrassment at 
home for the sake of rescuing the garrison on sphacteria, securing the return of 
Pylos, and preventing future aid from athens to rebels among the Helots. With 
such a concession it was highly probable that Megara would have been compelled 
to return to the delian league, thus walling off all of attica from the Pelopon-
nesians while opening access for athenian expansion through the Crisaean gulf. 
the envoys’ position had been made impossible by the nature and form of the 
athenian demands, however, and they returned to sparta. so the negotiations 
failed, and the war went on and on and on.
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No one can know for sure whether different terms and a different way of 
offering them might have resulted in a treaty ending the hostilities, at least 
temporarily. shortly after the botched negotiations, however, the athenian gen-
eral demosthenes and, surprisingly, Cleon managed to defeat and capture the 
spartan garrison at sphacteria, including 120 full spartiates, sons of the leading 
men in sparta. the surrender was a severe blow to spartan prestige. because of 
the famous refusal of the three hundred spartans to surrender to the Persians at 
thermopylae, nothing in the war shocked the greeks more than the surrender of 
the garrison at sphacteria (4.38–40). the greeks discovered that spartans were 
mortal too. Moreover, the spartans began to doubt themselves. fearful that Helot 
incursions from the sanctuary at Pylos would lead to revolution at home, they 
ceased offensive operations outside the Peloponnesus and sent more envoys to 
athens. yet the athenians “kept grasping for more” than the envoys could negoti-
ate and dismissed one embassy after another (4.42). Meanwhile, the athenians, 
holding hostage the prisoners taken from sphacteria, believed they could attack 
almost anywhere (Corinth, the Peloponnesian coast, anactorium, Cythera, 
Megara, or elsewhere) with impunity, for if they had a setback, they believed, they 
could always negotiate at that time from a position of strength (4.41–55).
When the tides of war shifted once again in sparta’s favor, however, the athe-
nians came to regret demanding more than sparta could accept (5.14). this 
confirms that genuine peace, like war, must involve at least two sides. Not only 
must the defeated party renounce efforts to revise the terms in the future, but also 
the victor must refrain from demanding terms that can only make the defeated 
party desire to renew or escalate the conflict when opportunity permits. the vic-
tor needs to avoid reinforcing the defeated belligerent’s will to resist; the defeated 
belligerent needs to calculate whether it can live with the victor’s terms in the long 
run or must accept those terms only so long as they are absolutely necessary to 
serve some larger end.31
of course, the most famous effort to terminate the war is the Peace of Nicias, 
appropriately named in athens after Nicias, the athenian statesman and general 
who most wanted peace, one who shared Pericles’s caution but lacked his ambi-
tion for Mediterranean hegemony. He too sought personal fame, that of a peace-
maker, at a time when the athenians were willing to give peace a chance. His 
opportunity came from a startling upset victory by the spartans. leading a ragtag 
force of elite spartan soldiers and Helots who had been promised freedom for 
their service, brasidas, the most daring and innovative spartan general of the war, 
managed to make his way from the Peloponnesus through barbarian-controlled 
thessaly and Macedonia to Chalcidice, where athens had many important 
tribute-paying allies, silver mines, and lumber yards to supply wood for ships. a 
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“good speaker for a spartan,” brasidas, somewhat like t. e. lawrence of arabia 
among the arabs within the ottoman empire in the first World War, managed 
to convince athenian allies that sparta actually meant to liberate them from the 
athenian empire. by promising lenient terms to those who joined sparta against 
athens, he convinced several cities to rebel, the most important being amphipo-
lis, a colony founded by athens and a nerve center for the athenians, who were in 
need of supplies and a secure sea line of communications to the Hellespont (4.81, 
4.84, 4.106). Perhaps most important, amphipolis was a symbol of effective re-
sistance to the athenian empire, which both Pericles and Cleon had called a tyr-
anny (2.63, 3.37). so long as amphipolis and other cities in Chalcidice remained 
independent, they would give hope to others that resistance to athenian tyranny 
was not impossible. In other words, the independence of these cities meant a risk 
that the athenian empire would fall apart. 
Having set this sword of damocles hanging over the heads of the athenians, 
the spartans opened negotiations with them and achieved a one-year armistice 
(4.117). However, brasidas—the glory of liberating these cities having perhaps 
gone to his head—disregarded and disobeyed orders not to prosecute further 
hostilities (4.135), putting his operations increasingly in conflict with the spar-
tans’ current political objective of a negotiated peace. so it was probably a stroke 
of good fortune for sparta’s peace party that he, the best spartan general of the 
war, and Cleon, the most bloodthirsty athenian general (who, thucydides said, 
needed the war to continue to distract attention from his crimes and slanders 
against his political opponents in athens), were both killed in combat at am-
phipolis (5.10). the most prominent proponents of the war on both sides were 
dead, thus enabling a change of leadership and a change of political objectives, 
at least temporarily, with both athens and sparta willing to settle for minimum 
objectives (5.16). 
both sides had powerful but unequal motives to end hostilities. the athenians 
needed amphipolis back to stem the tide of revolt among their allies, and, having 
suffered a punishing defeat at delium, especially, they had lost the confidence 
that had once led them to take the offensive almost everywhere. the spartans had 
come to understand that their original strategy of devastating athenian territory 
and supporting allies in a multitheater war could neither bait the athenians to 
fight them outside the walls of athens nor overthrow the maritime empire that 
enabled athens to continue the fight. the surrender of the soldiers at sphacteria 
was a disaster “hitherto unknown” in sparta; spartan lands were being plundered 
from Pylos and Cythera; and the Helots were deserting their farms for the insur-
gents, whose attacks tied down much of the spartan army. sparta feared that free 
Helots from outside sparta would join forces with those inside. Perhaps most 
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importantly, sparta’s treaty with argos, another treaty with an expiration date, 
was about to end, meaning it might soon have to fight athens, argos, the Helots, 
and any others who might wish to join the fray, all at the same time (5.14). 
With new leaders in sparta and athens, a compromise was possible. In ath-
ens, Nicias, who counted himself lucky to be successful so far, wished “while still 
happy and honored, . . . to secure his good fortune, to obtain a present release 
from trouble for himself and his countrymen,” and to earn his own immortality. 
He meant to “hand down to posterity a name as an ever successful statesman” 
who had made a lasting peace, arguably an accomplishment greater than that of 
Pericles. since he had been successful so far, and war is an affair of chances, the 
best way for him to win the ancient greek equivalent of the Nobel Peace Prize was 
to make the peace that bears his famous name (5.15–16). for his part, the spar-
tan king Pleistonax, who had been accused of accepting bribes to end the first 
Peloponnesian War, saw an opportunity to redeem his reputation from this and 
other scandalous accusations. thinking that “in peace no disaster would occur” 
for which he was likely to be held responsible “and that when sparta recovered 
her men there would be nothing for his enemies [in sparta] to seize upon,” he too 
was willing to lend his name to ending active hostilities (5.17). to strengthen his 
negotiating position, he openly made plans not merely to invade and ravage but 
also to occupy attica and garrison fortifications within it, meaning the athenians 
would not be able to return to their homes and farms if he carried out his plan. 
so conditions were ripe to make a trade. 
Under the treaty, the athenians would get amphipolis and other Chalcidean 
cities back as tribute-paying allies, provided the athenians did not molest the 
citizens of those cities and allowed them to be independent. (It was unclear how 
sparta could give back to athens cities liberated by brasidas if they objected, 
as they certainly would, knowing the ruthless treatment that defeated rebels, 
like Mytilene and scione, usually received from athens [3.50, 5.17–18, 5.32].) 
In return, the athenians were supposed to surrender cities and places captured 
during the war, including Pylos, and to release any spartan prisoners they held. 
like most other treaties in thucydides’s narrative, this one came with an expira-
tion date. It was supposed to last for fifty years, thus suggesting the irony that in 
thucydides’s account the further away the expiraton date of peace treaties, the 
less likely the peace is to endure. to ensure fidelity to the terms, each side was to 
swear an oath to the gods, who presumably punished oath breakers. Here is an-
other irony of thucydides’s chronicle—it consists of the moral, intellectual, reli-
gious, and legal somersaults that would-be and actual belligerents were willing to 
perform to convince themselves and others that they had not violated a treaty or 
other convention, that the gods were not against them but actually on their side. 
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In other words, they were extraordinarily skillful at finding pretexts to violate 
their treaties, so the oaths were next to meaningless as guarantees of the peace.32 
If Pericles’s primary objective at the start of the war was to break up the Pelo-
ponnesian league, then athens clearly won the Peace of Nicias. sparta’s principal 
allies—the boeotians, the Corinthians, the Megarians, and the eleans—refused 
to go along with the treaty (5.17 and 5.21), partly because it allowed sparta and 
athens to revise its terms without consulting them. these allies began to make 
separate arrangements with each other, thus giving athens a god-sent diplomatic 
opportunity to isolate sparta in the Peloponnesus. rightly, however, thucydides 
calls the Peace of Nicias a “treacherous armistice,” not a peace (5.26). sparta sim-
ply could not deliver on its promised terms, which were unenforceable. the am-
phipolitans refused to return to the delian league, and nothing sparta could say 
would make them do so. Indeed, sparta’s own general Clearidas, seeing the treaty 
as an act of treachery against those whom sparta had promised freedom, refused 
even to try to turn the liberated cities back to athens (5.21). sparta, its traditional 
allies having repudiated the treaty, was obliged, for fear of war with argos, to seek 
a new alliance in athens. the erstwhile enemies duly formed a fifty-year alliance 
pledging to wage war and make peace together and committing athens to help 
sparta put down Helot rebellions if they occurred. after signing the alliance, the 
athenians gave sparta its prisoners back, though they held on to Pylos just in 
case they needed it as security for the hoped-for return of amphipolis (5.23–24). 
iv
although many in greece believed the conflict was over, thucydides, in retro-
spect, demurs. the full-scale war that followed six years later was not a separate 
war but a continuation of the second Peloponnesian War, which had been a 
continuation of the first Peloponnesian War. In the six years of the Peace of 
Nicias, byzantine diplomacy carried on the unending war by other means. the 
(nominally) fifty-year treaty and alliance could not “be rationally considered a 
state of peace, as neither party either gave or got back all that they had agreed” 
(5.26). added to this, numerous violations of its terms occurred, most notably 
the battle of Mantinea, the largest land battle of the war, pitting athens and 
argos, athens’ new ally, against sparta. Perhaps if the athenians had supported 
their new ally more effectively and instigated a Helot revolt at the same time, this 
could have been a decisive victory on land for the athenians. as it was, because 
the athenians were half-hearted, some wanting to finish off sparta and others 
wanting to save the so-called peace, the spartans were able to defeat the coalition 
and restore much of their own martial prestige (5.75). all the protection athens 
now had from its enemies to the north in boeotia was an armistice renewable 
every ten days (5.26). 
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Most importantly, the treaty did not resolve the original cause of the war—the 
fears in sparta and among its allies of the growth of athenian power. the athe-
nians needed a break, but they had not ceased to be ambitious to expand. If any-
thing, the war had only fortified this hunger, a dream deferred so long that delay 
could no longer be tolerated. the series of treacherous diplomatic realignments 
during the period of official peace was as confusing as the “Who’s on first?” logic 
of abbott and Costello, but sparta’s original allies eventually got over sparta’s 
original betrayal. fear of athens drove them back into alliance with sparta. the 
war had settled nothing, and every day without active hostilities meant that ath-
ens was growing stronger, filling its treasury with tribute, building more ships, 
and training new crews for the next round—in sicily. 
the athenians had coveted sicily since before the second Peloponnesian War 
and (contrary to Pericles’s advice to avoid overextending themselves) had visited 
several times, even while the war back home was hot, to “test the possibility of 
bringing sicily into subjection” (3.86, 3.115, 4.2, 4.24–25, 5.4). the athenians had 
even fined one of the naval commanders on these missions and banished two 
others for allegedly taking bribes 
to depart when they might have subdued sicily. so thoroughly had their present pros-
perity [after victory at Pylos] persuaded the athenians that nothing could withstand 
them, and that they could achieve what was possible and impracticable alike, with 
means ample or inadequate it mattered not. the reason for this was their general ex-
traordinary success, which made them confuse their strength with their hopes. (4.65)
for thucydides, neither Pericles nor his successors, save Nicias, ever intended 
to renounce or even compromise their objective of establishing for athens the 
greatest name, based on the greatest rule over the greeks, an objective that 
pushed them toward dominating the larger Mediterranean world, and ultimately 
to sicily. that ill-fated adventure did not arise from a change of policy but from 
a change of strategy, based on both worst-case assessments (of what might hap-
pen if sicily united under syracuse and aided the Peloponnesians) and best-case 
assessments (of athenian prospects of success in a faraway theater on an island 
larger than attica itself, with cities whose total population was larger than that of 
athens) (6.1, 6.6–8). each of these assessments was preposterous: first, syracuse 
was no threat to athens until the athenians went to sicily and stirred up the 
hornet’s nest; second, the sicilian city of egesta, which wanted their aid against 
its perennial enemy selinus, had deceived the athenians into thinking it would 
pay for the expedition (6.46). 
these are classic examples of how to manipulate allies or enemies into doing 
one’s bidding, based on appealing to their worst fears and fondest hopes, though 
here the athenians deceived themselves at least as much as they were deceived 
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by others. athenians believed that even if they failed in sicily (in spite of the 
enormous power of the force they sent) athens would suffer no harm, because of 
the disarray in the Peloponnesus and the so-called peace treaty with sparta and 
its allies (6.24). In this they were at least partly right. It was unlikely athens could 
have held whatever it conquered in sicily, especially if Carthage intervened, but 
the expedition need not have led to disaster. that was the result of judgments of 
the ground commanders, Nicias especially, and their dysfunctional relations with 
the people of athens (7.42, 7.48). among other things, Nicias’s procrastination 
in sicily gave the spartans opportunity to catch the athenians in the grand-
strategic trap they had always dreamed of—a protracted, multitheater war, with 
fronts both in attica (where this time the spartans fortified deceleia and cut off 
the athenians from their farms and mines) and in sicily. the effort drained the 
athenian treasury and compelled athens to demand higher tribute from its al-
lies, which encouraged those allies to rebel as soon as they got the chance (7.28). 
all this and more was handed the spartans when the athenians lost the best of 
their army and navy at syracuse, thus removing much of Persia’s reluctance to 
intervene. It was anything but inevitable that athens would lose the war even at 
this late date, but it now simply could not afford to lose a decisive battle at sea and 
desperately needed peace to reconstitute for another round.
It is tempting to see athens’ comeuppance, not merely in sicily but also in 
the war itself, as a form of divine punishment; however, thucydides, who barely 
hides his skepticism about the greek gods, gives us no reason to reach such a 
conclusion. thucydides’s world is ruled not by the gods or by karma; instead, it is 
conditioned by a natural economy of power and violence that endures today. Hu-
bris and nemesis, whatever their religious connotations, are natural phenomena 
for thucydides; they are seen time and again not only in this war but in war in 
general.33 Had athens not self-destructed in sicily, it would have done so eventu-
ally somewhere else—in Italy or Carthage, for example—because it was drunk 
on the passion for power and glory. that passion, requiring continual expansion, 
was inculcated but not invented by Pericles in the funeral oration, and it found 
its most virulent expression in alcibiades’s speech before the sicilian expedition 
(6.16–18, 6.24).34 true, athens did sober up in the immediate aftermath of disas-
ter in sicily (8.1), but again, the athenians were born to take no rest nor to give 
any to others. 
although thucydides lived through the end of the war, he did not finish his 
account of it. Perhaps he died, perhaps something else took priority, but other 
sources confirm thucydides’s characterization of the athenians as a people in-
capable of making a durable peace because they could not be sated with power. 
after surprising comeback victories in the last years of the war, at arginusae 
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especially, the athenians, thinking they were rising again, refused spartan offers 
of peace on the basis of the status quo, an offer they would have accepted gladly 
immediately after the failed sicilian expedition. during the fierce and confused 
battle at arginusae, perhaps the largest naval battle of the war, many athenians 
fell into the sea, leaving their commanders torn between saving them and pur-
suing the retreating Peloponnesian fleet; in the event they left ships behind to 
rescue the survivors, but a storm made that impossible. When the commanders 
returned to athens, the athenians did not congratulate them on their victory or 
take a deep breath because of the chance of peace it offered. Instead, they put on 
trial all eight for failing to save the drowning sailors. all were convicted, six were 
executed, and two fled before they were killed by the very people whose empire 
they had saved. Not long thereafter athens lost its fleet, control of the sea, and ul-
timately the war, along with its democratic regime, at aegospotami, through the 
tactical incompetence of a commander who allowed his fleet to be surprised on 
the beach. surely one reason for that was that the athenians themselves had killed 
or driven into exile their best admirals. If they had made peace after arginusae, 
they would not have lost the war, at least not for good.35 yet war, says thucydides 
in his account of the revolution in Corcyra, is a “rough master” (3.82). It produces 
what we today call Ptsd, post–traumatic stress disorder, which distorts, even 
deranges, judgment, not merely among soldiers and sailors but among the people 
too. However rational the athenians under Pericles may have appeared at the be-
ginning of the war, they were irrational, if not truly mad, at the end—they could 
not make peace. tragically, thucydides’s account from the plague to the sicilian 
expedition and beyond to the revolution in athens shows the gradual breakdown 
of strategic rationality in the world’s most famous democracy.
for thucydides, expansionist powers who refuse to make peace (when neces-
sity demands and opportunity allows) create and perpetuate the sort of fear 
seen in sparta and its allies, a fear that leads others to check them, if necessary, 
by overthrowing their regimes and establishing something fundamentally less 
threatening. sparta did that to athens after its surrender, and the grand alliance 
of the United states, great britain, and the soviet Union of World War II did it 
to the axis powers. at no place in thucydides’s account was athens ever a sated 
power, but it ought to have been one, a lesson that perhaps no greek city, least 
of all athens, could ever learn. this suggests that preventing great-power war in 
our own time will depend on the willingness of former belligerents—like China, 
the United states, and their respective allies, for example—to accept the results 
of their previous conflicts in Korea (where there is still only an armistice) and 
over islands, including taiwan, off the coast of China as final enough not to need 
revising by violent means.36 they need to act like sated powers—what athens 
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should have been in this conflict, not what it was. Preventing great-power war in 
the twenty-first century will therefore depend at least as much on self-restraint 
as on deterrence. that is a lesson that great powers especially often fail to take 
away from thucydides’s “possession for all time”—his account not merely of the 
origins and conduct of the heartbreaking war between the Peloponnesians and 
the athenians but also of their tragic failure to make a genuine peace while there 
was time, opportunity, and overwhelmingly good reason to do so.
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